This paper addresses perceived difference in temporal pace within nature and considers how epistemological debate is conditioned by such difference, drawing on the work of Norbert Elias. The first part of the paper debates the equivalence of 'natural time' and 'social time'. The acceleration of human social pace is also explored, along with the human capacity for plasticity and change, and the contrast which such plasticity presents in relation to the seeming longevity of many natural processes. The epistemological implications of these arguments are considered in the second part of the paper, focusing on the difficulties which human plasticity creates for current social theory (with particular attention to critical realism). In the final part of the paper, the foregoing discussion is used to re-evaluate sociologies of nature through reference to the sociology of the body.
Introduction
This paper explores relative differences in perceived temporal pace between natural and social processes. It argues that temporal pace is particularly significant to the way that we comprehend natural and social processes, conditioning the appeal of epistemological argument, such as that relating to critical realism or social constructionism.
In contrasting 'nature' and the 'social', the intention is not to create a dualistic position. Nature encompasses all of the diverse connections between that which we label the physical, biological and social arenas (Elias, 1992 ). Yet maintaining an antidualistic position does not mean that we have to deny that there are any differences between natural and social processes. I wish to maintain an anti-dualistic stance but remain open to difference. Stating this position is important if only because there has been a tendency to decry or downplay the human 'obsession' with differentiation.
The distinctions which we make are seen as questionable, or unfortunate, projections on to a world which is fundamentally 'one', an 'undivided whole' (Bohm, 1980: 11) .
Yet an uncritical commitment to 'narratives of wholeness' may be problematic. In particular there is a danger that such a commitment will blind us to the relative differences, if not divisions, which appear to exist within nature. It is to the possibility of such difference that I wish to attend, and to the ways in which it may condition epistemological debate.
The paper is organised in three parts around three sets of questions. The first question is whether there is equivalence between 'natural time' and 'social time'.
Through reference to the work of Barbara Adam, John Urry and Norbert Elias, I shall suggest that the assumption of such equivalence is not justified. Instead I will propose that the longevity that seems to characterise many natural processes is not similarly apparent within the social arena. The second question is concerned with whether perceived temporal pace conditions epistemology. To illustrate this issue, attention will be paid to the epistemological difficulties that are raised by a stress on temporal pace, with particular reference to critical realist argument. The third question focuses on whether perceived temporal pace implicitly informs sociologies of nature such as the sociology of the body (Shilling, 1993; Soper, 1995) .
In what follows, I will draw on argument within the natural and social sciences. In so doing, I do not assume that such argument can be used as a basis to make clear ontological statements. Instead, I am concerned with what such work appears to suggest about natural and social time, accepting that this is qualified by the contingencies of natural and social science knowledge (Hacking, 1999) . Central to my argument are (1) the perceived temporal pace of social and natural processes, (2) the relation of temporal pace to the plasticity of human beings, as particularly reflected in language and tool-use, (3) the seeming 'acceleration' of the social pace of change.
Equating Natural and Social Time
The studies of Barbara Adam and John Urry address the question of whether natural and social time is equivalent. Both authors have adopted a dual strategy in order to advance a certain model of time, nature and the social arena. Firstly, they both argue that social scientists have adopted an outmoded Newtonian model of temporality and natural science which needs to be replaced by post-Newtonian proposition (Adam, 1998; Urry, 2000) . Secondly, they suggest that such post-Newtonian models of temporality are relevant across the natural and the social arenas, with this argument being particularly pursued by Urry (2000; cf., Macnaghten and Urry, 1998) . I shall seek to question both these arguments.
For Adam, the influence of Newtonian time appears almost Satanic in its ideal of 'independence of time and space ' (1998: 40) . She suggests that Newtonian time 'excludes life … knowledge … any kind of human activity, emotion, interest and frailty ' (1998: 40) and is 'dominated by Cartesian dualism ' (1990: 152) . In direct contrast to these 'sins' of Newtonian physics, both Adam (1998) and Urry (2000) praise the metaphorical virtues of post-Newtonian science, especially that associated with quantum mechanics, the second law of thermodynamics, and chaos and complexity theory. Instead of decontextualised objectivity and temporal reversibility, these newer natural sciences propose that time is irreversible and characterised by disequilibrium and complexity. Urry has particularly sought to promote the similarities between such newer natural sciences conceptualisation of time and those developing within sociology and social science. For example, the post-Newtonian stresses on impermanence, turbulence and instability appears mirrored in the growing social science emphasis on mobility and fluidity, rather than social stability (Mol and Law, 1994; Castells, 1996) .
Though the work of Adam and Urry is of considerable interest, a series of questions arise with their argument. For example, it might be objected that Adam overstates her case since Newtonian models have been under siege for some time, and it is therefore not the case that social sciences have not caught up with changes in the natural sciences. Social scientists have not generally clung to Newtonian arguments such as that of temporal reversibility. Moreover, notions of objectivity, temporal staticity and decontextualisation have been subject to considerable critique over several decades, not just amongst those supporting constructionism or a 'postmodern' epistemological position. Such critique has been accompanied by a widespread rejection of the 'apeing' of the natural sciences, as well as attacks on the Cartesian dualism which Adam (1990) associates with Newtonian thinking.
More significantly, there are difficulties with the parallels that Urry (2000) makes between the natural and social sciences. Urry cautions against social scientists, once again, copying natural scientists. He notes that he does not wish 'to imply that natural science models of time should be directly transplanted into social science' (Urry, 2000: 123) . Yet he then devotes considerable space to drawing analogies between natural science temporal perspectives and those relevant to social processes. In consequence, Urry could be accused of largely ignoring his own caution. Moreover the parallels that he draws between natural and social temporality can appear 'stretched'.
For instance, together with Phil Macnaghten, Urry has argued that there is a glacial aspect to social time (Macnaghten and Urry, 1998; Urry, 2000) . This may, for example, be reflected in people's feelings that the social and physical landscape of particular communities is timeless, or will at least 'still be there … in many generations' time' (Urry, 2000: 159) . But this latter argument of social 'glaciality' is open to critique since it can be argued that these are just short-term perceptions, reflecting a mourning for the past and a desire for stability in a world of accelerating social change. As Lash and Urry (1994: 246-247) themselves note, such nostalgia is conditioned by the speed of social change (Virilio, 1991) . The question arises as to what is 'glacial' about our social lives beyond a desire for stability which is at increasing variance with the actuality of people's experience. Yet once one doubts this example of glacial social time, Urry's argument about the metaphorical similarity of social and natural temporality starts to unravel. For it remains difficult to draw strong parallels between the temporal paces of natural and social processes, particularly
where the former appears glacial or 'galaxical'. Though some humans may desire 'glacial' stability, it is difficult to locate social parallels to the apparent inter-millennial stability associated with natural elements such as carbon, or enduring biological characteristics such as DNA.
Such difficulties raise the issue of whether it is mistaken to seek a metaphorical symmetry between natural and social temporality which Adam, and particularly, Urry seem to want. Such desires do have the advantage that they 'bypass' ontological and epistemological differences between the natural and the social. Yet though the appeal of such a 'bypassing strategy' (Latour, 1999: 17) has been much invoked, the question arises as to its legitimacy if it avoids rather than confronts difference. To consider the alternate argument that social and natural temporality are differentiated, I shall now explore the work of Norbert Elias. In so doing, I shall draw on representation of the physical and biological arenas within the natural sciences.
Such reference is undertaken for the sake of argument. It is not meant to imply that such representation is beyond critique or unaffected by the social construction of scientific knowledge.
Differentiating Natural and Social Time
Using Elias to emphasise temporal differentiation may seem a strange choice given that he is generally portrayed as a theorist who stresses the close interweaving of time, nature and the social. Thus Adam argues that Elias 'transcends the dualisms of … natural-social time ' (1990: 18) and Urry approvingly cites Elias's argument that 'nature, society and individuals are embedded in each other and are interdependent (1992: 16)' (quoted in Urry, 2000: 119) . Yet while Elias does adopt an anti-dualistic stance that stresses the interweaving of the natural and social, he does not treat natural and social time as equivalent. In particular, Elias (1991a) clearly distinguishes between natural and social time with regard to their relative pace of change. These differences in pace, Elias asserts, are central to how we understand the natural and the social sciences. Firstly he stresses that the 'physical arena' exhibits an extremely slow pace of change with the consequence that current analyses of it may have validity in thousands of years time. As Elias observes of experiments in physics:
'One can legitimately expect [physics] experiments done in one's own present time to have the same results as they would have had 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 years in the past or the future and, who knows, at any point in the universe ' (1991a: 172) This is possible because 'the tempo of physical evolution, compared to the development of human societies, is extraordinarily slow' (Elias, 1991a: 173, added emphasis). Elias comes to a similar conclusion when comparing social and biological processes. For Elias, our bodies have natural scripts such as 'blood and bones' which are 'biological universals' (Elias, 1992: 149) , and which are often so slow to change and evolve that it almost appears as if they 'do not change over time' (Elias, 1992: 149 ). Yet these same bodies 'respond' to a relatively quickly changing social arena. As Elias notes: 'Blood circulation and brain structure, birth and death are shared by all people. But this can no longer be said of the structure and dynamics of the groups formed by human beings, nor, therefore, of language. These can change relatively quickly. They are different at different times and in different places ' (1991a: 174, added emphasis) Elias thus suggests that our bodies contain very slowly evolving natural processes, yet interact with a rapidly changing social arena.
Elias's argument is therefore that physical and biological processes are often far slower to change that those of the social. One might however moderate this argument, and Elias partly does so i , to note that, (1) it is within current representation of the natural and social sciences that natural processes appear slower and, (2) natural science remains historically contingent (Hacking, 1999) . In addition, one might wish to stress that nature represents shifting assemblages, molar and 'molecular multiplicities' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 30) that traverse what we label the social, the physical and biological. Yet these qualifications do not detract from Elias's argument that social and natural processes appear characterised by differing temporal paces. What is perhaps more contentious is Elias's suggestion that epistemological position is determined by temporality. Elias argues that different epistemologies apply to biology and physics because they seem to have greater longevity and a slower pace of change.
Elias suggests that one cannot:
'.. on the plane of .. relations between people .. proceed with the aid of concepts … of the same kind as those used on the level of atoms or molecules ... [since we lack] the assumption that the same regularities that can be observed in the present are to observed in all places and times, past, present and future, in exactly the same way' (Elias, 1991a: 173-174, added emphasis) This argument is open to critique. Firstly it might be criticised for appearing to denote a Newtonian sense of time, but as Elias makes clear elsewhere (Elias, 1970: 360-361; 1974: 21-24; 1992: 39-44, 121-130) , this is not his intention. Though not guilty of this 'sin', it could be argued that Elias employs a (now) dated conception of natural science temporality that has been overtaken by developments such as 'quantum reality' or chaos and complexity theory which have resonance across the physical, social and biological sciences (Wagner, 1999) . Such work questions the assumptions of regularity, replicability and predictability implicit or explicit in the quotations from Elias (1991a) above. As Prigogine argues, 'classical science emphasised order and stability; now, in contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, and limited predictability at all levels of observations ' (1997: 4) . For Urry (2000) , this post-Newtonian world requires a new sociology based on mobile concepts such as networks, 'flows' and 'scapes'. The predominant image in packaging these transformational desires is that of complexity, fluidity and 'flux', of 'flowmations' rather than formations (Bachelard, 1983; Lash and Urry, 1994; Mol and Law, 1994; Castells, 1996; Luke, 1998) . When all is a complex flow and flux, can we speak of endurance and predictability?
It is certainly the case that notions of endurance and predictability have been challenged. Yet a lack of predictability does not necessarily mean an absence of determinism. As Derek Lovejoy notes, complexity theory has given rise to:
' a fundamental confusion between determinism and predictability. Nobody doubts that the phenomena underlying the weather are deterministic, but the weather itself is, nevertheless, not entirely predictable'
ii (1999: 445; cf., Bird, 1997: 144) Furthermore, there remains the danger that the current emphasis on fluidity, flow and flux will obscure longevities which are apparent 'under normal circumstances' within natural processes. For instance, as Elias (1991a) implies, physical elements such as carbon appear highly enduring physical properties throughout the universe. Similarly, though physical processes can exhibit rapid change such as that of weather patterns, it remains the case that the physical relations underlying such phenomena seem remarkably enduring. For instance, consider the following statement:
'make water hot and it will tend to expand' (Collier, 1994: 65) Such a physical relation is both central to the 'complexity' and 'flux' of weather patterns, yet looks likely to hold over past and future millennia. To put this another way, though complexity and flux problematise linear predictability (Byrne, 1998) , they do not imply a lack of longevity within 'nature' since the complexity and flux of, say, weather patterns rely on remarkably enduring natural processes such as the expansion and evaporation of heated water (see below). Even quantum physicists implicitly assume longevity in quantum mechanics. On the one hand, the processes that they are observe may be random and extraordinarily fast. Yet on the other hand, the relations and codes within such processes seem to endure. If it were otherwise we could not use our hi-fi equipment. The latter relies on quantum mechanics and on the observation that these mechanics seem to endure and are repeatable again and again.
Otherwise our hi-fis just wouldn't work on more than one occasion.
Similarly, at the level of the biological, there are aspects of our bodies that appear very slow to change. Fossil records show that the human 'brain of 100,000 years ago is the same brain that is now able to design computers' (Mayr, 1997: 74) . Such assertions of stability are not meant as a blanket endorsement of evolutionary biological argument which is clearly historically contingent, influenced by the values and desires of its practitioners (Keller, 1991) . Neither are they meant to suggest that human biological processes are necessarily very slow in their 'operation'. On the contrary, much of the living world appears subject to constant and very fast change, and to this extent, seems to be 'constantly in flux' (Birke, 1999: 151) . As François Jacob argued, a bacterial cell can contain 'some two thousand distinct reactions' which 'diverge and converge at top speed ' (1976: 272) . In other words, cellular metabolism seems extremely rapid and cellular 'life' may be very short. Yet the reproduction of the bacterial cell, like other cells, also appears dependent on a structure which looks likely to have exhibited great longevity, namely the double helix of DNA. Similarly, evolutionary biological argument suggests that other aspects of cells, such as the existence of a membrane and cytosol, represent biological structures of considerable duration (Davey et al., 2001 ).
In sum, though many biological processes, such as cellular metabolism and sexual conception, are very fast, they appear to rely for their reproduction and structure on biological codes and forms that show remarkable longevity, such as the DNA that codes cellular reproduction and sexual fertilisation. As Elias (1991a) implied, evolutionary change in the structure of such codes seems very slow. Though evolutionary biologists differ, they predominantly portray evolutionary change as an often very slow process, whether evolution is viewed as gradual (e.g., Futuyma, 1983: 84-85) or as 'punctuated' (Eldredge and Gould, 1972) . Not withstanding certain exceptions (such as in bacteriology and virology), evolutionary change appears characterised by its 'frequency of stasis' (Mayr, 1997: 196) .
In sum, natural processes seem to show remarkable apparent variation in temporal pace, both phenomenal speed and extraordinary slowness. Yet, contra Urry (2000) , the millennial stabilities associated with natural processes are difficult to locate within the human social arena. For instance, supposedly enduring social processes, such as those associated with capitalism, appear fleeting when viewed from the galaxical timescale found with natural elements such as carbon or DNA. To take another example, our attitude towards violence against the body has changed rapidly in the West, (Elias, 1994) , a change which enabled Foucault to achieve his dramatic 'opener' in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1977) . In comparison to the inter-millennial stability associated with many physical and biological processes, human configuratonal shifts seem remarkably fast, as witnessed in the moves within a single millennium from tribalism to feudalism, monarchy, urban-industrialism, capitalism and global capitalism.
Given the popularity of the 'post-modern late sciences' of nature (such as quantum reality and complexity theory) that favour 'accidence' and indeterminacy (Virilio, 1991: 47) , it is important therefore to remember that the natural world is not characterised by total changeability and flux. If nothing else, there remain on Earth the 'essential constants … of current physics' (Virilio, 1991: 45) , namely gravity, Planck's constant and the speed of light. Though there is now debate as to whether the last of these was the same when the universe was very young (Albrecht and Magueijo, 1999) , this does not detract from the consensus that the speed of light has remained constant for numerous millennia. Similar constancy is not apparent within social processes. Given their endurance, the most likely candidates are language and
technology. Yet such human social attributes are characterised by remarkable plasticity and flexibility and are not associated with the millennial stability of natural constants such as the speed of light. 'Liquid language' (Bachelard, 1983: 189) , technology and human symbolic activity remain areas where the 'flux' metaphor is largely deserved since, 'like the societies where there they flourish' (Elias, 1982: 68) , they are 'always in flux … and always evolving' (Elias, 1992: 132) .
To conclude this section, Elias's work dramatises the significance of temporal pace differences between natural and social processes and the stark differences in longevity seemingly apparent within each arena. In consequence, though it is mistaken to erect absolute ontological and epistemological divisions based on perceived temporal pace, it is equally suspect to assume a totalising position that states that all is 'flux' since this denies differences in the plasticity and pace of change between natural and social processes. Flux and complexity do not cancel out the longevity and slow pace of change that seem to characterise many natural processes. In comparison to the latter, the human social pace of change can often appear rather 'fast'.
Social Pace
The argument that human social life is characterised by rapidity of change has of course been highlighted by recent argument. In particular, it is suggested that social pace is 'accelerating' as 'people race on a treadmill at increasingly frenetic speeds' (Macy, 1993 : 206, quoted in Urry, 2000 . Speed becomes the constant desire (Virilio, 1986) , 'going faster equals getting better, accelerating becomes improving, quickening cashes out value adding' (Luke, 1998: 172) . This acceleration has supposedly now achieved such pace that 'anything is possible' (Thrift, 1999: 60) , with the consequence that 'more persons, in more parts of the world consider a wider set of possible lives than they ever did before' (Appadurai, 1996 : 53, quoted in Thrift, 1999 . For some, 'time is compressed and ultimately denied in culture, as a primitive replica of the fast turnover in production, consumption, ideology and politics ..' (Castells, 1996: 462-463, added emphasis) iii .
Urry argues that such 'instantaneous time' is part of why we need a 'new agenda for sociology ' (2000: 1) . Earlier debates over structure and agency, methodological individualism or holism 'are unhelpful ' (2000: 15) . A new sociology needs to focus on networks rather than social structures and stress 'mobilities for the twenty-first century' (Urry, 2000 , book sub-title) rather than the staticity of sociological concepts employed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The fluidity captured through concepts such as networks is not however simply a 'twenty-first' century phenomenon. Plasticity, mobility and fluidity can be seen as sharply developing human social characteristics since the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution (Nowotny, 1994) . It was during the Enlightenment that the word 'progress' came to refer to progression through time rather than space, a development that is subject to ironic treatment in Hogarth's paintings (such as A Harlot's Progress, and A Rake's Progress; Macey, 1994) . Such sensitivity to the ironies of change suggest an already jaded acclimatisation not just to 'progress' but to the dubious benefits of accelerating human plasticity (cf., Nowotny, 1994: 85-86 ).
The observation of accelerating social pace raises the question as to why it should occur. In addressing this question, I shall draw again on Elias. Following Elias, acceleration appears as an almost inevitable consequence of the evolution of the 'human condition'. That people have not generally seen this before is because of 'the relatively short-time span of a human life [which] appears to serve people as their principal frame of reference' (Elias, 1991b: 30) . We tend to think of our emotions as 'natural', of human beauty as 'timeless', or capitalism as the 'end of history', even though our emotions are culturally and historically conditioned (Lutz, 1988; Elias, 1994; Newton, 1998) , human beauty was once perceived as Rubenesque rather than slim, and capitalism is a very recent development. Yet from a millennial perspective, seeming 'natural' human constants appear transient. Similarly, we tend to think of some human concerns as timeless, such as the questions posed by religion or death.
Yet we forget that in 1000 years time, the form of religious practice -as distinct from that of carbon, water or DNA -is likely to have changed considerably, or in a postsecular society, it may even have disappeared altogether. Similarly, the meaning of death is subject to change, as witnessed in the transition from the medieval experience of a 'public' death to its present privatisation 'behind the scenes of normal life' (Elias, 1985: 85) , where it is sequestered, denied (Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 1992; Mellor and Shilling, 1993) and less available as the potential 'wise advisor' (Casteneda, 1974 : 51, quoted in Willmott, 2000 . In general, social forms such as the meaning of death, 'natural' emotions, human beauty, or religious practice remain mutable and transient.
In understanding this transience, Elias particularly emphasises human language iv (Newton, 1999) . He argues that our linguistic ability has freed the human species from a predominant reliance on genetic evolution: 'Languages enable humans to transmit knowledge from one generation to another and thus make it possible for human knowledge to grow ' (1991b: 32) . Not only do linguistic skills provide a means of social development 'well over and above' genetic evolution, these same linguistic abilities also represent one key means of escaping the very slow time frame through which genetic evolution may occur. In other words, human discursivity is central to the relatively fast pace apparent with social change when compared to the seeming slowness of much of the biology of genetic evolution. This is not to suggest that the social and biological are other than 'a coherent whole' (Bohm, 1980: ix) . It is instead to reassert difference. As Jacob comments on genetic transmission, 'in the living world, the order of order is linear ' (1976: 286) . In comparison to this seeming fixity of genetic reproduction, its programmed nature, human language is open. As Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari argue, 'in language, not only is expression independent of content, but form of expression is independent of substance ' (1988: 62) . Critically, 'the same form can pass from one substance to another, which is not the case for the genetic code, for example, between RNA and DNA chains ' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 62) . It is this 'independence' of language, its 'free-floating' form where referent is unhitched from object that creates a potentiality for rapid social change. In contrast, the genetic codes of DNA and 'messenger' RNA are often fixed for considerable periods of time, linearly programming the structures of proteins and cells. Even when there is disturbance to a DNA sequence (through mutation) 'thanks to the blind fidelity of the mechanism, [it] will be automatically reproduced' (Monod, 1972: 109) . This relatively fixed relation between genetic code and biological structure is not apparent in relation to language.
Language as a code does not determine social structure.
For Elias, such linguistic facets give the human species a particular plasticity. This plasticity arises 'because the malleability of human symbols and thus the tempo of change …, by and large, is so much greater than the overall tempo of evolutionary change at the level of stars and galaxies or that of living organisms' (Elias, 1982: 35) Unlike the pre-programmed constancy of carbon or DNA, the social arena relies on a human willingness to create constancy (through institutions, social structures, shared cultures). This constancy is far from inevitable. Because language and technology are open and plastic, we can advance inconstancy and the 'acceleration' of instability.
Human techno-linguistic skill allows for a rapidity of change and a 'capacity to transcend our species-specific time' (Adam, 1995: 28) , not just with respect to our social lives but also in relation to nature. This is dramatised in the case of genetic engineering which enables human beings to rapidly combine genetic material that have taken millennia to evolve. More generally, the 'plasticising' of the body through biotechnology can be seen as a partial collapsing of time frames that characterise the biological and the social. Some biological processes that could not be changed (because they took millennia to do so) can now be changed within human timescales.
To summarise this part of the paper, I have argued that varying temporal paces seem to exist within and between natural and social processes. In particular, the longevity that still characterises many physical and biological processes is not similarly apparent within the social arena. Extending from Elias, this is because human technolinguistic skills represent open codes which give human sociality a remarkable plasticity and fluidity. This effect can be seen as cumulative since language and technology allow knowledge to be transmitted across generations. Over the last millennia, this has developed to a level where human plasticity appears to be rapidly accelerating, facilitated by 'fast' techno-linguistic development.
Temporal Pace and Social Theory
In the remainder of the paper, I wish to explore some epistemological implications of the foregoing argument. This is not an entirely new terrain, particularly within critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989a) . As Tony Lawson, notes:
'Certainly, some allowance must be made for the fact that the natural sciences, by and large (but not exclusively), concern themselves with improving their theories of a relatively unchanging (or only slowly changing) reality while the social sciences concern themselves with understanding … a relatively fast changing reality, i.e., a highly space-time specific, world ' (1997: 224) Or as Andrew Collier acknowledges: 'Of course, there is a vast difference in timescale between the "relative endurance" of social structures and natural ones ' (1994: 244) In what follows, I wish to focus on arguments which are made epistemologically problematic by the perceived pace of social change and contrast this problematic with that apparent within natural processes. I shall explore two areas that have particularly concerned critical realist writers, namely, (1) conditional social 'laws', 'recipes' and 'tendencies', and, (2) endurance and social structure. In so doing, I do not seek to argue that critical realism is inappropriate to social analysis. Instead, I wish to use critical realist argument to illustrate the problematic posed by temporal pace.
I also want to briefly consider social constructionist proposition. I shall argue that although such work can appear receptive to 'fast' social change, there still remain difficulties in its ability to comprehend nature.
Laws, Tendencies and Recipes
The relatively fast pace apparent in social change raises the question of whether all social analyses must remain highly time-space specific. If everything is continuously being socially transformed, can we entertain ideas of social relations that will transcend time? Critical realists argue that we can. I will seek however to debate this contention.
At first sight, critical realism appears immune to any critique based on temporal pace because of Bhaskar's distinction between 'contingent, historically transient ' (1989a: 5) human knowledge and an intransitive realm that is 'irreducible to patterns of events and active independently of their identification by human beings ' (1989a: 11) . Social analysis of fast temporal pace merely reflects transitive knowledge, the 'changing knowledge of unchanging objects' (1989a: 11, added emphasis). Critical realist argument thus seems capable of accommodating an apparently fast pace of social change beyond which some measure of social stability may exist within a supposed intransitive realm.
Yet there are two difficulties created by this argument. The first is that this philosophical dualism creates an ultimately unknowable intransitive 'other' where 'reality appears to be governed by its own laws in some independent realm that is distinct from humans' (Burkitt, 1999: 73) . The second is that a number of critical realists espouse a desire for transitive knowledge that is time transcendent. In other words, they want to specify 'tendencies' that can stand the test of time. Their strategy for achieving this goal is based on the argument that time can be transcended by predicting the form of social relations which will arise whenever particular conditions are found. Collier illustrates this thesis through the example of capitalism.
Collier argues that:
'[social] laws can be formulated in terms which are universal, by virtue of being conditional: "if the ownership of productive wealth is separated from the direct producers and divided between competing sellers of the products, then tendencies x, y, z will operate"' (Collier, 1994: 244, original 
emphasis).
In other words, Collier argues that there is a 'deep generative structure' to capitalism such that one can formulate universal social laws as to its operations given particular conditions. In consequence, even though social structures are 'only relatively enduring' (Collier, 1994: 244) , they are time transcendent by virtue of operating whenever 'tendencies x, y, z .. operate' (Collier, 1994 : 244, see above). Benton makes a very similar point in arguing that social structures have 'tendencies and powers' which are 'universal wherever the appropriate structures are instantiated ' (1981: 18, added emphasis) . Similarly Archer suggests that social and cultural 'recipes' 'will still work if tried a hundred years later when someone re-discovers it and has the motive to try it ' (1995: 144) . In effect, these writers argue that even if the social arena is characterised by a seemingly fast temporal pace of change with increasingly fluid social structures, transitive social 'laws', patterns and 'recipes' can nevertheless transcend time because particular 'tendencies' will be observed whenever the 'right' conditions exist.
Such arguments may hold in particular and limited situations. For example, one can posit the following as a conditional social 'law': wealth inequality tends to be correlated with social disadvantage. However even this statement is very different to the apparent stability of certain physical processes. Consider again the statement, 'make water hot and it will tend to expand'. Collier uses exactly this statement as an example of a 'tendency ' (1994: 65) associated with a causal law. Yet as a 'natural' tendency, it differs from a social tendency because, as Roy Bhaskar acknowledges, 'social structures and mechanisms are more highly space-time specific than natural (e.g., biological and geological) ones typically are ' (1989a: 175, original emphasis) . For instance, it is probable that the statement, 'make water hot and it will tend to expand', will hold in another millennia, the only proviso being that water and heat still exist.
Chaotic or complex behaviour does not negate the endurance of such probabilities (Eve, 1997) . The heating of water is a 'chaotic process' yet still seems to inexorably lead to expansion and evaporation. Even within quantum mechanics, it is likely that the probability of a researcher seeing a wave or a particle will be the same in another millennia. For though the object of study within quantum mechanics is inherently probabilistic, the properties of the distribution appear stable across time. In other words, although the outcome of a particular experiment may well change from experiment to experiment, the probability of the outcome is likely to be the same in a thousand years time (even though 'scientific understanding' of the processes involved may alter). Yet such apparent durability is unlikely in the social arena. It is difficult to state, say, the tendencies associated with wealth inequality in another millennia, because they appear likely to vary considerably, as reflected in the last millennia across tribal, feudal, capitalist, and global capitalist societies. Beyond the general difficulties of explaining open systems (Bhaskar, 1978 (Bhaskar, , 1989 , the specificity of the social means that there is very little probability of observing any particular social tendency a thousand years hence. In sum, although conditional transitive social laws, patterns and recipes can be formulated, one has to question their relevance and time transcendence when they apply to highly specific moments in time and space v . 'Fast' social pace means that it becomes very difficult to establish that any tendency reflects any supposed conditional social law vi .
If one adds accelerating social pace to this argument, the desire for time transcendent transitive knowledge becomes further compromised. A very fast changing social arena only implies greater specificity and a consequent inability to specify social patterns or recipes that have any constancy across time.
Social Structure
In an increasingly changeling world, it becomes difficult to argue that social structures are characterised by even short-term endurance. As Tony Lawson notes:
'the faster nature, or greater space-time specificity, of social structures and mechanisms is itself sufficient for the hermeneutic moment to arise more frequently in social science … As structures and actions are continuously transformed the social scientist will frequently need to re-investigate what is going on to keep abreast of the inherently non-predictable developments regularly taking place, including the transformation of human concepts ' (1997: 225, added emphasis) Yet the problem is not just that of 'keeping abreast' of social change. It is also that 'continual transformation' undermines the very relevance of social structure. Its significance is called into question in an accelerating world since social structures are traditionally seen as 'mechanisms that withstand the march of time' (Braudel, 1972: 353) , or at least resistant to it. The sociological centrality of structure, and structure/agency debates, is lessened when human plasticity means that fewer and fewer 'social structures [are] sufficiently enduring for their examination to be feasible and worthwhile' (Outhwaite, 1987: 53) . If social structures are fleeting, they lose much of their traditional meaning. Some writers may regret the increasing dominance of 'the terrain of the socio-cultural rather than the social structural' (Howson and Inglis, 2001: 314) , but such dominance needs to be seen within the temporal context of seemingly accelerating human plasticity. If we are moving toward a changeling world, the socio-cultural may advance, and the social structural wane.
This issue has preoccupied critical realists (e.g., see Benton, 1981; Outhwaite, 1987; Collier, 1994) , epitomised by their repeated critique of Bhaskar's argument that 'social structures, unlike natural structures, may be only relatively enduring ' (1989a: 38) . For some, endurance becomes a key issue. Margaret Archer asserts that it is 'only on the metaphysical assumption that some relations are necessary and at least relatively enduring can we reasonably set out to practice science or to study society' (Archer, 1995: 166, added emphasis) . In other words, the social world only becomes empirically accessible to investigation because of the relative endurance of social relations and structures. Based on this premise, Archer further argues that 'some version of "social science" could not even be voiced' if 'everything were subject to pure contingency' or where 'everything is flux ' (1995: 166) .
Given this commitment to social endurance, it is not surprising that critical realists highlight the existence of social stabilities such as the enduring roles of employer and employee, or landlord and tenant. Such roles have a 'durability over time, a capacity to endure despite ... changes in the personal features of their successive holders' (Archer, 1995: 276, added emphasis) . Though critical realists note the significance of social construction (Bhaskar, 1978) , they are nevertheless keen to stress that not all social reality is just present social construction. In other words, we are still strongly conditioned by the past. Although we may be witnessing faster change in areas such as social class, this does not mean that such change has yet become 'rapid'. On the one hand, social stratifications such as that of class are not simply given but are socially constructed with the consequence that their 'attributions, psychic identifications and claims may vary greatly' (Anthias, 2001: 386) . Yet on the other hand, the pace of change of such attributions and identifications can still be relatively slow. As Gerard Hanlon argues, service classes are currently 'in the process of fragmenting ' (1998: 58) . Yet as he also suggests, such 'intra class fragmentation will .. be a slow process -long-term party voters will not change their long-term political allegiances overnight' (Hanlon, 1998: 58) . Such endurances suggest that it is premature to suggest that the social landscape is already one of total turbulence, flux and change.
However qualifications must be made to the above arguments. Firstly, from the position of the 'very longue durée' such social stabilities remain extremely short-term, a 'drop in the historical ocean'. From an inter-millennial perspective, social structures such as feudalism or capitalism represent very short, albeit significant, social developments. From this Eliasian viewpoint, the pace of social change still appears very fast. Social structures may be defined by their endurance (Sibeon, 1999; cf., Giddens, 1984) , but it is only when viewed from the perspective of an individual human lifetime that they appear stable. Secondly, even situations of seeming stability may themselves engender major social change, as illustrated by the argument that the social 'revolution' of the 1960s was conditioned by the economic stability of the 1950s and 60s. Thirdly, social relations that formerly appeared stable, such as that of the nuclear family, may become increasingly unstable if the pace of social change is accelerating. Fourthly the seeming simplicity of supposedly enduring roles, such as employer and employee, can hide considerable ambiguity and complexity. As Castells notes, 'who are the owners, who the produces, who the managers, and who the servants, becomes increasingly blurred in a production system of variable geometry, of teamwork, of networking, of outsourcing, and subcontracting ' (1996: 475) . Sixthly the particular form of 'enduring roles' can swiftly change depending on their social construction. For instance, the interdependency between employer and employee, or between landlord and tenant, can change rapidly through industrial relations or housing legislation, or through variation in the extent to which such legislation is locally enacted. To take one example, employer-employee relations quickly changed during the Thatcher administration of the 1980s.
Critical realists respond to such argument by pointing to further examples of relative social endurance (e.g., Lawson, 1997: 206-207 ). Yet demonstrating such endurance is not always straightforward. For instance, Margaret Archer (1995) argues that demography is a social structure with 'a relatively enduring emergent property'
(1995: 143-144, added emphasis). As Archer points out, demographic structures are slow to change their age structure: a demography that is 'top-heavy' with a high proportion of older people will not change quickly to its opposite, a high percentage of young people. Yet contrary to Archer, this is chiefly because of the apparent endurance of biological time and biological structures, not social structures. If the eggs of human beings were 'hatched' within a week, and then reached sexual maturity within months, demographic structures relating to age might change much faster. The human pace of demographic change is limited by the slowness of embryonic growth as well as the many years between birth and sexual maturity (Heer, 1975) . This means that we cannot 'breed like rabbits'. The endurance of demographic structures therefore derives from their biological stability and the inability to 'speed up', say, embryonic gestation or human maturation. We cannot re-write our biology, and this constitutes the principal reason why demographic age structures represent an enduring configuration. Contra Castells (1996) , human biology is not (yet) as plastic as social processes.
Demography is of course as much social as biological. There is no ontological divide and the social and biological remain intertwined. Yet it is the biological aspect of demographic age structures that largely guarantee their endurance, not as Archer suggests, it's social structure.
In sum, it remains the case that the social arena is not characterised by total flux and flow. There remain stabilities and it seems likely that critical realist argument will seek to capitalise upon them. Yet some social stabilities may largely reflect biological stabilities. In addition, social stabilities are slight in comparison to the apparent longevity of many natural processes and must be seen in the context of seemingly accelerating human plasticity. If acceleration proceeds 'apace', the debate is likely to sharpen between those who defend 'old' sociologies, such as that of social structure or even social laws, and those who proclaim a new sociology that either draws on social constructionism or stresses 'diverse mobilities' (Urry, 2000: 15) . Yet, as I shall argue below, this does not mean that there will necessarily be a clear 'winner' in these debates.
Temporal Pace: Epistemological 'Winners'?
None of the above argument is intended to suggest that critical realism is a failed project or necessarily antithetical to social change. In any case, critical realists have deliberately addressed change by enrolling argument that embraces dynamic systems 'whose state changes with time' (Stroup, 1997: 126) , such as that of chaos and complexity theory (e.g., Byrne, 1998) . Instead, my concern has been to use aspects of critical realist argument in order to illustrate how perceived temporal pace problematises epistemological argument, such as that relating to conditional social 'laws' or social structure.
Though critical realism (and realism more generally) retains relevance, it can however seem that social constructionist argument is better suited to an accelerating social pace.
For example, imagine that we have 'accelerated' to a world where human plasticity becomes total and social scripts are continuously re-written. If all social life was open, plastic and rapidly changeable, it would be endlessly re-created, and we would endlessly socially re-construct our worlds. If human plasticity were total, the social arena would be open to continuous social reconstruction, and thereby also to constructionist argument. In consequence, those sympathetic to social constructionism can more happily embrace acceleration.
Yet such argument does not mean that constructionism will soon reign triumphant.
Even if acceleration proceeds apace, it is unlikely that all social stabilities will disappear. Firstly, the social is likely to continue to be conditioned, if not determined, by biological stabilities, such as those associated with gender, ethnicity, parenthood or, as noted above, human maturation. Secondly, there remain a number of social stabilities that appear resistant to rapid change, such as that of social class. Thirdly, the seeming stability of many natural processes constrains our ability to socially reconstruct our world. In particular, this stability limits the totalitarian ambition of strong social constructionists for whom 'nature is a system of arbitrary signs' (Tester, 1991:46) . For example, we cannot as yet remove the threat of nuclear waste (Murphy, 1994) . We cannot simply talk it out of existence. Nuclear installations contain a hybridity of physical and social processes (Callon, 1991) and thereby also a hybridity of different temporal paces. 'Risk' derives directly from these different temporal paces since the social context of nuclear power can change rapidly to one characterised by, say, political instability or military conflict, yet the temporal pace of nuclear radiation appears decidedly long-term. We are not as yet such overseers of time that we can 'turn off' nuclear radiation or quickly reverse bio-chemical pollution, and therein lies the problem for 'the daughters and sons of our own and other species for thousands of years hence' (Adam, 1996: 326) . The world is not yet plastic, pliable, or therefore, 'arbitrary' (Tester, 1991: 46) .
In sum, though constructionism does have a strong appeal in a thoroughly plastic world, we are as yet some distance from such a landscape. In this context, though temporal pace issues may increasingly condition epistemological argument, as exampled by debate over realism and constructionism, this does not mean that such argument will be easily resolved.
Temporal Pace and Sociologies of Nature
The above argument raises the question of how sociologists are meant to tackle sociologies of nature which necessitate working across natural and social timescapes (Adam, 1990 (Adam, , 1998 . In order to illustrate this issue, I shall examine work on the sociology of the body.
As Chris Shilling notes, 'the human body represents an excellent example of a phenomena that cannot be located exclusively in the social or the natural world ' (1993: 104) . At the same time, the body is illustrative of epistemological tension such as that between realist and constructionist argument. Kate Soper summarises the difficulty of reducing the body purely to constructionist analysis. As she notes, 'if the body is viewed as entirely the historical effect of cultural powers, then no plausible explanation can be given of why it is that all human bodies are subject to processes of growth, reproduction, illness and mortality' (Soper 1995: 133) . In sum, though we socially construct biological discourse, processes of bodily maturation nevertheless appear to represent natural 'scripts' which cannot just be re-written by discourse or 'constituted by culture' (Bordo: 1998: 90) . At the same time, there remain difficulties in epistemologically reconciling the 'culture' and 'nature' of the body (Soper, 1995) .
Such difficulties do not seem surprising when viewed from the perspective of temporal pace. For example, to the extent that the sociology of the body is concerned with a biological body (Benton, 1991) , one is dealing with bodily processes that, in part, appear characterised by a very slow pace of change, such as that of the structure of cells, protein and DNA. This slowness of change means that certain realist assumptions of structure, relative endurance, and even conditional predictability are easier to defend. At the same time, sociological inquiry that is based solely on strong constructionism is likely to be constrained because our bodies seem to contain longevities that put them beyond social construction. As argued above, human beings look likely to be largely composed of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, no matter what we say or do -because these chemical elements appear so enduring.
Yet the body is not just a biological entity but also a cultural object. The social interpretation of the body can rapidly change, as exampled by the increasing neuroticisation of the male body (the desirability of 'six packs' etc.). The rapidity of changes to such cultural performances means that realist assumptions of relative endurance or stable structures are far more difficult to maintain where the body is treated as cultural object. Because these performances are discursive, they are characterised by the linguistic plasticity and changeability associated with language.
Establishing endurance, or time transcendent cultural 'recipes' around the social body remains difficult given the plasticity of bodily performance where cultural meanings can quickly change.
Culture, psyche and soma of course remain intertwined. Yet biological and social aspects of the body also represent the interweaving of different timescapes. In trying to sociologically 'grapple' with the body, one is confronted with the difficulty of deriving a common epistemology across differing timescapes where part of what one is looking at can appear stable for millennia, whilst other aspects may last no more than a few weeks (as with the fashions of body clothing). Those who attempt to explore across the biological and social must confront such epistemological difficulties, and therefore need to 'tread warily'. The oscillation between realist and constructionist epistemologies of writers such as Soper (1995) can be seen in part as a tortuous attempt to reconcile these differing timescapes.
Summary and Conclusion
Post-Newtonian science has encouraged a vision of natural processes as governed by turbulence and impermanence. The appeal of such images to social scientists is understandable given the seemingly accelerating turbulence, instability and uncertainty of the social arena (Nowotny, 1994) . Drawing parallels between a postNewtonian universe and social processes also speaks to the desire to get beyond the 'Great Divide' between the natural and the social which allocates to 'natural scientist the things, to the sociologists the remainder, that is, the humans' (Callon and Latour, 1992: 357 ). Yet there is a danger that such desires will deflect attention away from apparent differences within and between natural and social processes. At the same time, it is easy to overplay the metaphors of instability, chaos and flux. All is not flux, and some natural processes seem to show remarkable stability and longevity.
Contrary to Urry (2000) , the temporal pace of the social is not metaphorically paralleled by that of the natural since social configurations do not appear to exhibit the same longevity as many natural processes. Extending from Elias, this lack of social longevity is related to the open flexibility built into human social processes through techno-linguistic skill. As Deleuze and Guattari argue, since human 'form of expression becomes linguistic rather than genetic … it operates with symbols that are comprehensible, transmittable and modifiable ' (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 60) .
Such open social aptitude allows human beings to transcend the limitations of a linear genetic code with the consequence that 'human societies can very radically change without gene change' (Elias, 1991b: 86) . As the perceived pace of social change accelerates, the assumption that 'some relations … are at least relatively enduring' (Archer, 1995: 166) becomes more difficult to substantiate. As argued above, it is not that such propositions are inappropriate to the social arena but that they are circumscribed by human plasticity.
Aspects of epistemological debate, such as the between critical realists and social constructionists or between proponents of the social structural vs. the socio-cultural, therefore need to be seen in the context of apparent temporal differences between natural and social processes. Accelerating social pace seems likely to frame debate between those defending an older sociology of enduring patterns and structures, and those proclaiming a brave new terrain where all is mobile or open to socio-cultural reconstruction. Human plasticity contains the potential to increasingly erode constancy and epistemological argument that assumes such constancy.
What remains of interest is how far human techno-linguistic skill will enable us to increasingly plasticise biological and physical processes and 'short-circuit' seemingly millennial natural stabilities. Are we moving toward plastic bodies (with 'clonable' parts) and a pliable world where we will be able to play with all the times of nature?
If we move toward the latter scenario, current differences between natural and social times will increasingly erode. Such developments are likely to heighten the epistemological debates considered above. For instance, is the past of any relevance to the present or future (Archer, 1995) if all structures continually dissolve in a plasticised world of endless change? In such a universe, will thoughts of enduring patterns resemble an anachronistic phantasy (Castells, 1996) ? Will our entire world one day become equivalent to our imagination?
There are problems though with such futuristic scenarios. There is a danger that we will be carried away with their phantasies of control and thereby ignore our inability to plasticise nature. We may still be a long way from being able to re-write nature's codes through, for example, finding a replacement mechanism for DNA. Similarly, as
Elias observed, the fact of our ageing and death 'reminds us that here and there the power of human beings in relation to the natural universe has its limits ' (1985: 78) . In spite of our social desires, we cannot as yet control the times of nature and the 'reality' of death, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions (Soper, 1995) . Furthermore, the danger with phantasies of a plastic world is that they will downplay continuing differences between natural and social times, as already seems apparent in relation to nuclear radiation, GM crops and environmental degradation (Murphy, 1994; Adam, 1998) . Whatever the case however, whether we face celestial dreams where the world is, at last, 'ours', or the hellish reality of a nuclear or biotechnological nightmare, it seems unlikely that issues of time and pace will go away.
